Abstract-While binning is a fundamental approach to blind data embedding and watermarking, an attacker may devise various strategies to reduce the effectiveness of practical binning schemes. The problem analyzed in this paper is design of worst-case noise distributions against -dimensional lattice quantization index modulation (QIM) watermarking codes. The cost functions considered are 1) probability of error of the maximum-likelihood decoder, and 2) the more tractable Bhattacharyya upper bound on error probability, which is tight at low embedding rates. Both problems are addressed under the following constraints on the attacker's strategy: the noise is independent of the marked signal, blockwise memoryless with block length , and may not exceed a specified quadratic-distortion level. The embedder's quadratic distortion is limited as well. Three strategies are considered for the embedder: optimization of the lattice inflation parameter (also known as Costa parameter), dithering, and randomized lattice rotation. Critical in this analysis are the symmetry properties of QIM nested lattices and convexity properties of probability of error and related functionals of the noise distribution. We derive the minmax optimal embedding and attack strategies and obtain explicit solutions as well as numerical solutions for the worst-case noise. The role of the attacker's memory is investigated; in particular, we demonstrate the remarkable effectiveness of impulsive-noise attacks as increases. The formulation proposed in this paper is also used to evaluate the capacity of lattice QIM under worst-noise conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VARIETY of blind watermarking and data hiding schemes has been developed over the last ten years. Much attention has been focused on quantization index modulation (QIM) methods, which are information-theoretic binning schemes and are relatively easy to implement [1] - [10] . The most important property of binning schemes is their ability to approach fundamental communication limits, such as the maximum rate of reliable transmission (data-hiding capacity) for a given family of attack channels and the error exponents (the rate of decay of error probability) at rates below capacity.
Different families of attack channels have been studied in [1] - [10] , corresponding to various degrees of generality in the channel model. This includes a single additive white Gaussian P. Moulin is with the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801 USA (e-mail: moulin@ifp.uiuc.edu).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2006.879299 noise (AWGN) channel, the family of all additive-noise channels subject to a squared-error distortion constraint, and the family of all channels subject to a squared-error distortion constraint. Most models assume the use of memoryless channels; in other models, this restriction is relaxed. For the watermarking games of [9] and [10] , in which the host signal is Gaussian and the squared-error distortion constraints are imposed on the embedder and the attacker, the capacity-achieving distributions turn out to be Gaussian. When no structure is imposed on the quantizers, random coding methods have been used to prove the achievability of capacity and error exponents [6] - [10] . Such methods are unpractical, but methods based on lattice vector quantization (henceforth referred to as lattice QIM) are more manageable. For AWGN channels, Erez and Zamir [6] have proven that such structural constraints on the quantizers do not cause a loss of capacity: capacity is achievable asymptotically as the lattice dimension tends to infinity. Surprisingly, a similar result applies to error exponents at high rates [8] . However, there is always a performance loss when low-dimensional lattices are used. For scalar QIM [2] , [5] , the lattice dimension is equal to one, and the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR) penalty for achieving a target rate is typically between 1.5 and 3 dB.
This paper is about achievable error probabilities for finite-dimensional lattice QIM methods at low embedding rates. Our study includes the popular scalar and hexagonal QIM methods as special cases. We consider the class of additive-noise channels subject to a squared-error distortion constraint, and various memory constraints. Detection-theoretic functionals of the noise probability density function (pdf) are formulated and used as cost functions in a game between the watermark embedder and the attacker. The strategies to be optimized by the embedder include the selection of the QIM lattice inflation parameter (also known as the Costa parameter) as well as randomization strategies. Fundamental to our study are the convexity properties of the cost functions used. Our methods are applied to error-probability, Bhattacharyya, and mutual-information functionals of the noise pdf.
Part of this study was reported in the second author's Master's thesis [11] . Related work, conducted independently of ours, includes Pérez-González [12] and Vila-Forcén et al. [13] , where the worst-noise pdf against scalar QIM was sought using a nonlinear optimization algorithm; and Tzschoppe et al. [14] , where the worst-noise pdf is sought within a nonparametric family, and obtained using an elegant application of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm. In both [12] and [14] , the cost functional was mutual information. In [13] , the cost functional was the probability of error based on a single received sample, and a minimum-distance decoder.
The general problem of design and analysis of worst-case additive-noise distributions appears frequently in the communications literature (e.g. see the analysis of [15] for worst-noise in 1556 binary-input channels). The mathematical structure of our optimization problems is, however, quite different from those in [15] because of the fundamentally different nature of the channel in the QIM problem: the channel introduces modulo-lattice additive noise (MLAN). As we shall see, the resulting worst-case distributions differ significantly from those in [15] . This paper is organized as follows. Section II states our block coding model, and Section III specializes it to the case of lattice QIM. Section IV defines the lattice maximum-likelihood (ML) decoder and sets up the game between the watermark embedder and the attacker. Section V solves the game for a simple but insightful special case: scalar QIM with binary alphabets, subject to memoryless attacks. Analytical solutions are derived, and the asymptotic optimality of impulsive-noise attacks at high watermark-to-noise ratios is established. Section VI treats the more general case of a -dimensional lattice subject to blockwisememoryless noise, and designs optimal attacks against the QIM code. To counter such attacks, a randomized rotation strategy is proposed for the watermark embedder in Section VII; the worstcase noise distribution is now isotropic. Section VIII extends these results to spread transform dither modulation (STDM) block codes, using a similar randomized rotation strategy: the host signal is projected onto a secret lower-dimensional subspace prior to embedding. The STDM case is more amenable to analytical exploration, and we present closed-form expressions for decoding performance under isotropic impulsive-noise attacks. In Section IX, we study the capacity limits of lattice QIM subject to the worst blockwise memoryless noise. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section X.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL

Notation:
We denote random variables with uppercase letters and individual realizations with lowercase letters. Boldface letters are used to represent sequences and vectors. The Euclidean norm of a vector is denoted by . The pdf of a random variable is denoted by . The volume of a set is denoted by , the indicator function of a set by , the Dirac impulse by , and the mathematical expectation operator by . Finally, given two functions and , we write (resp. ) as if the ratio tends to 1 (resp. 0) as . Let and be integers. (We use and as examples throughout this paper.) Referring to Fig. 1 , we wish to embed a message in a length-host signal sequence, using a two-stage code. The host sequence is subdivided into blocks of length each. We denote by the th host signal block . In the first stage, is mapped to a -ary sequence (codeword) using an error-correction code (ECC) with rate . The ECC will be referred to as the outer code. In the second stage, an embedding function is applied to each block. The th marked block is given by , where is a secret key (with alphabet ) shared with the decoder. The per-sample, mean-squared distortion of the host signal due to embedding is given by . The rate of the two-stage code is given by bit/sample (2.1)
The case corresponds to an uncoded scheme (high payload) in which no ECC is used in the first stage. The other extreme case , corresponds to a low-payload scheme in which and the ECC could be, for instance, a simple repetition code.
The choice of the attack models and performance metrics used in this paper is based on the assumption that the code rate is low and that the ECC is suitably randomized. Such would be the case, for instance, of random expurgated codes [16] , [17] and random constant-composition codes [18] .
The attacker chooses a noise pdf that satisfies the expected-distortion constraint (2.2) and uses this pdf to generate independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) -dimensional random vectors , to the marked blocks. Each is independent of . The quantity WNR is referred to as the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR).
The decoder observes the resulting degraded blocks and outputs a decision , where denotes the decoding function. Note that our attack model allows for dependencies between the components of , but not across blocks. If the ECC was not randomized, the attacker's performance could be improved by exploiting the structure of the ECC. Due to our assumption that the ECC is randomized, this strategy is not considered in this paper.
III. LATTICE QIM
Each symbol may be embedded into the host signal block , , using various methods [7] . Of interest in this paper are Chen and Wornell's QIM method; their STDM method [1] , [2] ; and, more generally, nested lattice codes [3] , [4] , [6] , [7] . We briefly review nested lattice codes and introduce the notation.
A lattice in -dimensional Euclidean space is defined as a set of points in such that and implies and , which equips with the structure of an additive subgroup of [20] . A nested lattice code consists of a coarse lattice and a fine lattice . The coarse lattice is a sublattice of . The fine lattice may be decomposed as the union of cosets of where . The choice of is nonunique, but it is convenient to choose a minimum-norm vector, in which case is called the coset leader of . The set (3.1) carries a group structure and is called the quotient group of by . may be efficiently represented by the coset leaders and . Next, we define quantization function mapping each point to the nearest lattice point in ;
Voronoi cell of .
Finally, a lattice inflation parameter ("Costa parameter") is introduced to control the amount of distortion compensation introduced in the embedding. The host vector is marked using the dithered-QIM formula (3.2) where is an external dither sequence, randomized over , and known to the embedder and the decoder but not to the attacker. The (second stage) watermarking code is the triple . The motivation for using the randomized dither vector in the QIM embedding formula (3.2) is twofold: i) improve security against surgical attacks, and ii) obtain a tractable model for the self-noise. The following examples of QIM watermarking codes will be used throughout this paper. 1 Example 1 (Chen-Wornell Scheme) : Let be the scaled -dimensional cubic lattice and be times the so-called checkerboard, or , lattice [20] . Here, , , is isomorphic to the group with two elements, and . The lattice is also known as the quincunx lattice [ Fig. 2(a) ]. Example 2: Take and let be the hexagonal lattice to be scaled by , and be the union of rotated by and scaled by and itself [ Fig. 2(c) ]. Then, is the cyclic group of order three and . Since is uniformly distributed over , the quantization noise is also uniformly distributed over and is independent of , for any random vector [21] . The mean-squared distortion due to embedding is
Neither distortion nor decoding performance is affected if the code representers in (3.2) are shifted by an arbitrary amount (i.e., if we allow ). For instance, in Example 1 above, one may prefer to use . As described in Section II, the attacker is subjected to a power constraint (2.2). For a given lattice , the embedder selects to optimize the performance of the system against the attacks. The attacker knows the watermarking code and optimizes the noise pdf . We call this noise pdf the worst attack. Modulo Operations: The operation on any is defined as . The shorthand denotes integration over a set , folded into by using the operation. Given a function , we define its -periodic extension as for all . The Dirac impulse on the torus is defined by the shifting property , for any and continuous -periodic function . The following properties of the operation will be used.
• Distributivity: , for all . • Uniform noise: if is random and uniformly distributed over , then so is for any random vector .
IV. QIM WATERMARK DECODING GAMES
A. Lattice Decoder
The QIM lattice decoder reduces the data to a lengthsequence of -valued statistics (4.1) After this reduction step, the dither values are no longer used. Note that further reduction of the data, in the form of a quantization of each to the fine lattice , would be tantamount to block-level minimum-distance decoding and would generally cause a loss of information about . Even in the absence of ECC, when blocks are independent and symbols embedded in different blocks may be decoded independently, minimum-distance decoding need not be equivalent to the optimal ML decoding rule. 2 An improved idea would be quantizing each to the cosets of the coarse lattice . While this operation is information-lossless in the absence of ECC, it is still information lossy when an ECC is used.
Denote by the pdf of random vector given that was embedded in the block. Under the hypothesis, that message was transmitted (and, thus, was embedded in block for ), the random variables are conditionally independent, with respective pdfs . To obtain good decoding performance, we need the pdfs to be "well separated," in a sense made precise below.
B. Equivalent Channel Model
Here, we derive a model for analogous to the MLAN model of Erez and Zamir [6] , in which was white Gaussian noise. The outer ECC maps message into codeword . In block , is the sum of the coset vector and a random vector where is the self-noise due to quantization, which is uniform over the scaled Voronoi cell (4.4) and is the scaled attacker's noise, folded into . Its pdf is (4.5) The parameter trades off the amount of self-noise against the attacker's noise at the receiver. When is small, the selfnoise dominates the attacker's noise. When , there is no self-noise, and . 2 The minimum-distance decoding rule coincides with the lattice ML rule in some cases, but not always. As an example, where these rules differ, consider scalar QIM with q = 2, = 1, and noise pdf p (w) = (1=2)[(w 0 a) + (w + a)], where 1=4 < a < 1=2. The lattice ML decoder is error-free because the rival pdf's p (ỹ) and p (ỹ) have disjoint supports. But clearly the minimum-distance decoder is always in error. 
C. Lattice ML Decoding Rule
We assume that all messages are equally likely. Due to the i.i.d. noise model, the decoder is assumed to be able to learn the noise pdf when the number of blocks is large enough. Therefore, we shall assume that the decoder knows and implements the lattice ML detection rule, which minimizes the probability of error given and [22] (4.8)
We refer to (4.8) as the lattice ML decoder. Its probability of error is given by (4.9) where we have used the shorthand .
D. Probability-of-Error Game
Given the watermarking code, the embedder wants to choose that minimizes . Similarly, given the code and the optimal , the attacker wants to choose that maximizes . Equivalently, we may adopt as the figure of merit of the system. This becomes a maxmin game between the embedder and the attacker (4.10) where the minimization is subject to the distortion constraint (2.2). Moreover, we shall see in Section IV-I that this minimization can be restricted without loss of optimality to a compact set of pdfs. The existence of a maximum and a minimum is then guaranteed because the cost functional is continuous and bounded, and the maximization and minimization are over compact sets. For , the union bound may be used to relate to the probabilities of error for all binary tests between messages
The union bound is achieved when . The special case corresponds to hard symbol decoding and generally a high probability of error-unless WNR is large. When , the cost function in (4.10) becomes (4.11)
E. Bhattacharyya Game
Even in the simple case , evaluation of the exact probability of error (4.9) requires the evaluation of an -dimensional integral, which unfortunately is infeasible unless is very small or is relatively large. For large , a more convenient approach is to use the Bhattacharyya upper bound on [7] , [17] , [22] . Appendix A presents a succinct derivation of the error bounds stated in this section.
Case : For simplicity, we begin with the case of two messages , , and a repetition outer code. The per-sample Bhattacharyya distance between and is given by [23] is tight in the exponent when and satisfy a certain symmetry property (as will be the case throughout this paper) (4.14)
Therefore, the Bhattacharyya bound is frequently used to predict how large should be to achieve a desired probability of error. 3 The upper bound in (4.13) is much easier to evaluate than (4.9), because the evaluation of requires only a -dimensional integration over , no matter how large is. Note that in practice, should be a relatively small number (say 1, 2, or 3); otherwise, the evaluation of itself becomes hard. Since is a function of and , we denote this function as . Instead of (4.10), we solve the simpler (and asymptotically equivalent) problem (4.15) where the minimization is subject to (2.2). The optimal value of is the maxmin error exponent for the game, and we refer to (4.15) as the Bhattacharyya game.
Case : The Bhattacharyya bound can be extended to the case of multiple messages. Different bounds can be considered (e.g., random coding bound and expurgated bound [16] - [19] ). To simplify the presentation, we fix one that is fairly tractable and provides a useful characterization of decoding performance at very low rates. Our performance metric is the Bhattacharyya parameter for the MLAN channel, which we define as (4.16) (i.e., the uniform average of the pairwise Bhattacharyya distances).
Equidistant Channels: If , the summand of (4.16) is the same for all , the channel is said to be equidistant [19] . All channels with binary inputs are equidistant. The MLAN channel with the hexagonal lattice of Fig. 2 (b) has three inputs and is also equidistant, as can be verified using a simple change of variables in the Bhattacharyya integrals. This holds for any choice of . The Bhattacharyya metric (4.16) is used in conjunction with the normalized minimum distance of the ECC, which is defined as follows. Denote by , the Hamming distance between two codewords and (the number of positions where and differ), and (4.17) the normalized minimum-distance of the code. Applying Plotkin's bound, we have for any -ary code [17, p. 549 ]. For many low-rate codes, the Plotkin bound is tight. When for instance, any reasonable code satisfies (i.e., achieves the Plotkin bound with equality). If tends to infinity as a subexponential function of , expurgated random codes [16] , [17] which holds and is tight in the exponent under the aforementioned assumptions of "good" codes with vanishing rate and uniform distribution over the alphabet . For expurgated, zero-rate, random codes, is the expurgated exponent [17, pp. 156, 540] . For equidistant channels, uniform is the optimal choice [19] .
F. General Mathematical Formulation of QIM Game
The games involving the and Bhattacharyya cost functions in (4.10) and in (4.16), can be written in the form (4.19) where the functional is convex in (Section IV-H). In the case of (4.10), we define . In the case of (4.16), we define which is strictly convex in (Section IV-H) and is a tight lower bound on . Since the distortion constraint (2.2) is linear in , minimizing over subject to (2.2) is a convex program [24] . The result of this minimization depends on and via their ratio WNR . The minimizer will be denoted by (4.20)
G. Ali-Silvey Distances
Consider the cost function specialized to the case in (4.11), and the Bhattacharyya cost function (4.16). Both cost functions are in the class of Ali-Silvey distances [26] , also closely related to -divergences [27] , [28] . An -divergence between two pdfs and is a measure of the dispersion of the likelihood ratio. It takes the form , where is any convex function on . We adopt the notational convention . In other words, the integral is actually over all such that and are not simultaneously zero. An Ali-Silvey distance is any functional of the form , where is convex on , and is an increasing function. We use the equivalent requirement that be concave on and be decreasing.
The relation between Ali-Silvey distances and the costs functions (4.11) and (4.16) is as follows.
• The functional (4.11) is an Ali-Silvey distance with and .
• The Bhattacharyya functional (4.16) is an arithmetic average of Ali-Silvey distances, with and . In the case, notice that is not differentiable at , which presents some technical problems when formulating optimality conditions and using certain convex optimization algorithms. To avoid such problems, one can "round off the corner" at (i.e., replace by a differentiable approximation), which can be made arbitrarily accurate in the sup norm.
Denote by , the minimum value (over all and all unconstrained pdfs ) of . For instance, in the case (4.10); this value is achieved when the rival pdfs , are identical, eliminating all traces of the watermark at the decoder. When is the Bhattacharyya parameter (4.16), we have . For all Ali-Silvey distances, we have , which is achieved when the rival pdfs are identical.
H. Convexity Properties
The analysis is facilitated by some important convexity properties of the probability of error and related functionals of . These properties are stated below and proved in Appendix B. Also note that in (4.6) is linear in .
is convex in ; 4) is convex in .
I. Bounded Support
Denote by , the topological closure of . Due to Proposition 4.2 below, from now on, we shall restrict our attention to supported over . Choosing a larger domain would introduce excess distortion. The minimum may be achieved by a pdf with impulsive components (on the torus . Since the set of all such densities is a compact subset of and the function is continuous and bounded from below, a minimizer is guaranteed to exist.
J. Invariance Properties
The invariance properties of the code and the cost function play a fundamental role in our analysis. This section defines the basic notions and illustrates them with the examples of Fig. 2 .
Recall that an isometry is an norm preserving the linear operator; in finite-dimensional spaces, isometries are unimodular matrices (i.e., matrices with determinant equal to 1). Examples include rotation matrices in and reflections about coordinates axes. A rotation matrix has degrees of freedom. When , the rotation matrix is of the form where the rotation angle is the single degree of freedom. The determinant of a rotation matrix is equal to 1. A reflection about the first coordinate axis is represented by the matrix whose determinant is equal to 1.
First, we examine the invariance properties of the QIM code. Let be the set of all isometries in the joint invariance group of the fine and coarse lattices and . Clearly, and inherit the same invariance properties and for all . For instance, in Fig. 2(a) , has eight elements: the four rotations by multiples of 90 , as well as the cascade of these rotations with a reflection about the first coordinate axis. In Fig. 2(b) , has 12 elements: the six rotations by multiples of 60 , as well as the cascade of these rotations with a reflection about the first coordinate axis.
For any isometry and noise pdf , define the transformed pdf by
Since is an isometry, introduces the same mean-squared distortion as
. If happens to be invariant to isometries in ( for all ), then is said to be -invariant. Finally, we turn our attention to the invariance properties of the cost function . Recall the definitions of for the and Bhattacharyya games considered in (4.10) and (4.16). By inspection of those expressions, we see that for any ( -invariant or not) (4.22) The functional is thus said to be -invariant. Proposition 4.3 4 : For any , the minimum in the -game (4.19) is achieved by some -invariant . Moreover, no other solution is possible if is strictly convex.
Proof: The claim is a consequence of the -invariance and convexity properties of . Since the self-noise is uniform over , its pdf is -invariant. It therefore follows from (4.3) that is -invariant as well. Now define the isometry-averaged pdf which is -invariant. By linearity of the distortion functional in (2.2), also satisfies the distortion constraint (2.2). Exploiting successively the convexity and the -invariance of , we may write (i.e., is at least as bad as ). If is strictly convex, equality is achieved if and only if .
V. SCALAR QIM, MEMORYLESS ATTACKS
We first consider the simplest nontrivial problem: scalar QIM with binary input alphabet and block length (therefore ). This design maximizes the Euclidean distance between the cosets and [29] . Denote by , the quantizer step size for the coarse lattice ; its Voronoi cell is . The distance between and is ; without loss of generality, we take 
A. Probability-of-Error Game
Let be either the cost functional (4.10) or a negative -divergence. The minmax game (4.19) between the embedder and the attacker takes the form (5.5) where the minimization is subject to (5.1). Our first result is a special case of Proposition 4.3. 
For the game with
Proof: See Appendix C. Fig. 5 shows the rival and that result from the optimal "four-delta attack" in (5.7). Case 1) of Proposition 5.3 is related to Proposition 5.2: the attacker does not need to use all of his or her distortion budget when WNR , because the devastating "two-delta" attack with impulses at only introduces distortion . We conclude that QIM without distortion compensation [1] completely fails against an intelligent attacker with power ; this holds whether the embedder uses an outer ECC.
At the other extreme, when WNR , we have and WNR. The optimal could be approximated with the "three-delta" attack that would result from selecting and WNR. 5 Note the continuous evolution of the optimal as WNR is increased from 4/3 to infinity. In the case , the error probability obtained in Case 2) is almost one-fourth of that obtained in [13] under different assumptions: minimum-distance detector instead of the ML detector, and attacker's pdf constrained to a "three-delta" class with mass at and at . 6 
C. Numerical Results
We have solved the Bhattacharyya game numerically using the convex programming resources of TOMLAB [30] . Integrals over are approximated with finite sums: we used a uniform discretization of the interval with 43 points. Fig. 6(a) compares the Bhattacharyya bound with the actual probability of error (for ) computed via Monte-Carlo simulations. The Bhattacharyya bound differs from the actual probability of error only by approximately 0.7 in units. 7 Fig. 6(b) shows the optimal as a function of WNR, and Fig. 7 shows the worstcase for three values of WNR. Note that the optimal is 5 The corresponding Bhattacharyya distance is (1=2)ln(9WNR=(4 (3WNR 0 1))). 6 The Bhattacharyya parameter for that particular attack is ln(3WNR=4)[i.e.,
twice the minimizing value in ii)]. It is also instructive to look at the effects of that attack on a length-n sequence. For that attack, the ML detector can err only when all n noise samples have absolute value 1=4; the probability of this event is equal to a (and the value of kwk is atypically large). As discussed in the text, when the ML decoder is used and WNR is high, the optimal attack puts mass in the vicinity of 61=2.
7 Also shown in Fig. 6(a) is an estimate of P calculated using a Gaussian approximation to V (with the same variance as the actual V ). While such "estimates" are often used, they have no theoretical justification, especially in the large-deviations regime (large n). In Fig. 6(a) , n = 15 and the Gaussian "estimate" is incorrect by four orders of magnitude. 
D. Impulsive Noise
While closed-form expressions for the worst are not available for , useful insights are obtained by analyzing the performance of impulsive noise, specifically the following 3-delta attack pdf:
WNR. This attack is feasible for all WNR . From Proposition 5.3, we also know that this attack is asymptotically optimal for large WNR, when . The corresponding Bhattacharyya distance is WNR WNR . However, we would also like to know whether the embedder can improve performance by choosing a smaller value of . Below, we derive simple expressions for the Bhattacharyya distance under the three-delta attack, valid for any . These expressions provide upper bounds on the value of the Bhattacharyya game, and they are tight for large WNR. The general idea, used to prove Proposition 5.4 below, is to write The bound (5.10) is quite tight. For instance, when WNR , the bound is approximately equal to 0.379. A numerical evaluation of the left side of (5.10) yields . Furthermore, let us compare (5.10) with the case of Gaussian , for which the optimal tends to 1 at high WNR Fig. 8 . Worst-noise pdf p for (a) cubic QIM scheme of Fig. 2(a) with q = 2, and (b) hexagonal QIM scheme of Fig. 2(c) with q = 3. In both cases, WNR = 1. Thus, the Bhattacharyya distance increases linearly with WNR under Gaussian but only logarithmically under the impulsive-noise attack.
To summarize the main practical results in this section:
• Impulsive-noise attacks are far more damaging than Gaussian attacks at moderate-to-high WNRs.
• The choice studied in the original QIM paper [1] performs catastrophically when WNR .
VI. ATTACKS WITH MEMORY
In this section, we return to our general setup with -dimensional lattices, and allow the noise -vector to have dependent components (i.e., memory). We wish to quantify the potential benefits of this strategy from the attacker's perspective. Recall from Section IV-J that the QIM code is invariant to isometries in a set , and that for any , the maximum of is achieved by some -invariant (Proposition 4.3). We have evaluated the Bhattacharyya distance as a function of for the scalar QIM code ( , ), the cubic QIM code of Fig. 2(a) ( , ) , and the hexagonal code of Fig. 2 (b) ( , ). Again, the optimization was implemented using TOMLAB; in the hexagonal QIM case, a hexagonal grid with 43 points along each diameter (total of 1331 grid points) was used to discretize and perform circular convolutions. The results are summarized in Tables I and II for WNR . The first table also includes results for STDM, which will be discussed in Section VIII.
The minmax optimal is shown in Fig. 8 (a) and (b) for the cubic and hexagonal QIM schemes considered. For cubic QIM, this is concentrated along the two main diagonals in the plane. This is not memoryless; the Bhattacharyya distance is 0.195 (i.e., a drop from 0.214 obtained under the worst memoryless attack of Section V). For hexagonal QIM, as might be expected, the worst exhibits six preferred directions. To summarize this section, memory helps the attacker to develop efficient surgical attacks against the lattice code by selecting the most damaging directions for his or her noise vector.
VII. LATTICE QIM WITH RANDOMIZED ROTATION
Finally, we provide the watermark embedder with a new strategy (besides dithering) to improve robustness against attacks with memory. Namely, we allow a randomized rotation of the lattice in addition to dithering. The issue is now to evaluate the usefulness of such randomization.
The basic QIM scheme with randomized rotation is diagrammed in Fig. 9 . For each block, a different is generated from the uniform distribution on the set of all rotation matrices (a continuum, unlike the discrete invariant set considered in the previous sections). The secret in Fig. 1 consists thus of the pair . Consider, for instance, the cubic lattice with and antipodal dither vectors . In Section VI, is deterministic, and so the vector is known to the attacker. In contrast, when is randomized, the vector is generated from the uniform pdf over the -sphere with radius . 
A. General Lattice QIM
For arbitrary -dimensional lattices and arbitrary , we now show that the worst attack pdf is isotropic. Denote by , the probability of error of the QIM scheme conditioned on a particular realization of the rotation matrices, and by the probability of error averaged over all . Also, denote by the Bhattacharyya cost function (4.16) under a fixed value of , and by (7.1) its average with respect to the uniform distribution on . As shown in Appendix A, the bound (4.18) on still holds.
Proposition 7.1: Under uniform randomization of the lattice rotation, the minimum over in the and games is achieved by an isotropic pdf. Proof: The Jacobian of is unity and, therefore, the functional in (7.1) is -invariant
For each value of , the functional is convex (by Lemma 4.1) and, therefore, in (7.1) is convex as well. To complete the proof, we apply Proposition 4.3. Since is -invariant and convex, its minimum is achieved by a -invariant (i.e., isotropic)
. The same arguments apply to the cost function . From Proposition 7.1, we conclude that the worst-noise pdf is characterized by a pdf , , in the radial direction:
. Hence, with a little abuse of notation, we write the optimization problem (4.19) as (7.3) where . The minimization over is subject to the distortion constraint
Due to (4.6), the mapping from to is linear (7.5) where (7.6) is the integration kernel, and denotes the centered -dimensional sphere with radius .
Note that Proposition 4.2 does not apply here because the attacker does not know the lattice orientation. The optimal radial pdf has unbounded support in general.
Lemma 7.2:
The and Bhattacharyya functionals are convex in .
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1 i) and ii), exploiting the linearity of the mapping (7.5) from to .
B. Numerical Examples
Again, we solve the Bhattacharyya game using the convex programming resources of [30] . Consider the cubic QIM problem with . In the case of a code with deterministic rotation, recall from Fig. 8(a) that the optimal directions for the noise vector are diagonal. In the case of a code with randomized rotations, the worst attack pdf is spread uniformly in all directions; its radial pdf is depicted in Fig. 10 . The value of the Bhattacharyya game is 0.235, compared with only 0.195 when no lattice randomization was used (Section VI). The benefits of randomized rotations are thus clear, as is the non-Gaussian nature of the worst ( would be Rayleigh in this case).
VIII. DITHERED STDM STDM is a projection method which first forms the dot product of , a length-block of host data, with , an arbitrary unit-norm vector. This is followed by the application of scalar QIM to the dot product . Chen and Wornell [2] used , , and no external dither . The code rate is typically low.
We choose uniformly distributed on the unit sphere, analogously to the randomized lattice rotation method in the previous section. Note that while convenient and nearly optimal for large block length , the choice is not optimal. We shall therefore not impose the restriction here. As we shall see, the STDM problem is insightful and mathematically tractable, even for large .
A. Worst Attack
The STDM quantizer step size is . For our statistical performance analysis, without loss of generality, we may assume that quantization is applied to the first component of the host signal (i.e., ). The results of Section VII extend to the STDM case as follows [11] .
The worst-noise pdf is isotropic, with radial pdf . We have , where (8.1) (with equality if and ). Similar to (7.5), we have for , where the integration kernel is given by a simple 1-D integral formula (instead of the -dimensional integral in (7.6)) (8.2) and (hence, , , and, by Stirling's formula, as ). Furthermore, the expression (8.2) for the kernel reduces to a finite sum with up to terms when ( is the Dirac impulse).
B. AWGN Delta Attack
For dithered STDM, if is AWGN and , we have, in the limit of large (8.3) In general, finding the worst analytically is difficult, even in the STDM case. Nevertheless, in this section, we show that for large , an effective choice for is an "AWGN Delta" distribution: the mixture of a mass distribution at zero and an AWGN with large variance. Such attacks have been used in the spread-spectrum communications literature and are very effective against block codes-see Viterbi's classical paper [32] for instance.
Let WNR denote the value of for the scalar QIM problem of Section V when is Gaussian and WNR . Define and let achieve the maximum above. It can be verified numerically that and . Delta distribution on the boundary of the feasible set takes the form where to satisfy the distortion constraint (2.2) with equality. Then (8.4) where the first inequality is due to the concavity of the functional (from Lemma 4.1(ii)). Thus, (8.4) yields
The quantizer step size for STDM is and, therefore, WNR . Choosing WNR proves the claim. When
, we obtain the following proposition. The upper bound tends to zero for large , indicating that the AWGN Delta attack is a powerful surgical attack against STDM-much more so than the AWGN attack whose performance was given by (8.3). We have obtained a similar bound for general lattice QIM with randomized rotation; derivations and results are not reported here due to space constraints. Therefore, even randomization of the lattice orientation does not suffice to guarantee good performance against an intelligent adversary. A possible improved strategy for the embedder is mentioned in Section X.
IX. CAPACITY
In this section, we apply our analytical framework to the problem of finding the noise pdf that minimizes capacity of a given lattice QIM system (as opposed to the probability of error studied so far); the minmax value of can also be derived in this framework.
Referring to the MLAN channel of Fig. 3 , the maximum rate of reliable transmission between encoder and decoder is given by where , and (9.1) denotes mutual information for the MLAN channel with input distribution and channel law , which depends on and . The problem reduces to a mutual-information game (9.2) where relates linearly to via (4.6). The cost function is convex in . The minimization over is subject to the distortion constraint (2.2), as well as to possible memory constraints.
If the alphabet for is the entire Voronoi region (as opposed to some discrete subset as used so far), some simplifications arise. Observe that [6] (9.3) where denotes the differential entropy of a random variable . Equality holds in (9.3) if is uniform over (then is also uniform over , due to the uniform noise property in Section III). Therefore, the maximum in (9.2) is achieved by uniform , and (9.2) can be reduced to our "standard game" (4. 19) , in which the cost function is the differential entropy , which is concave in . The relevant results of the previous sections apply to this cost function as well, including symmetry properties of the worst-noise pdf, isotropy under randomized lattice rotations, and numerical optimization methods.
We conclude this section by bridging some results from [10] and [6] . In [10] , the worst memoryless noise against any coding scheme (not necessarily lattice QIM) under squared-error distortion constraints was shown to be Gaussian. Likewise, the worst blockwise-memoryless noise is i.i.d. Gaussian. On the other hand, Erez and Zamir [6] were concerned solely about AWGN and proved the existence of a sequence of lattice QIM codes with increasing dimension that achieve the unconstrained capacity . Proposition 9.1 below shows that the attacker gains no advantage by using a non-Gaussian distribution against the Erez-Zamir scheme.
Proposition 9.1: There exists a sequence of QIM watermarking codes indexed by block length , such that the value of the mutual-information game (9.2) converges to the unconstrained capacity . The corresponding asymptotically maxmin solution is and . Proof: See Appendix E.
X. CONCLUSION
We have investigated a systematic approach to lattice QIM code design, based on probability-of-error and Bhattacharyya performance measures. For any value of the lattice inflation ("Costa") parameter , the worst-case attack pdf is obtained as the solution to a convex program; hence, globally optimal solutions can be obtained numerically. In some cases, analytical solutions can be found. For instance, if , the worst-attack pdf against scalar QIM (with ) allocates all of its mass to a small set of values.
We have optimized the parameter as well. Since the embedder does not know the attack pdf, is the solution to a minmax problem. We have found that impulsive-noise attacks are very effective at moderate-to-large values of WNR; the suboptimality of conventional AWGN attacks is striking at high WNRs.
Another useful strategy for the embedder is the randomized rotation of the QIM lattice. This strategy improves the robustness of the QIM code against surgical attacks. The worst-attack pdf is then isotropic.
It appears that making (the size of the quotient group ) large improves robustness against surgical attacks. This view is supported by the capacity results of Section IX, where the input alphabet to the MLAN channel is (a continuum) rather than a size-discrete subset of . Numerical results by Tzschoppe et al. [14] also support that view.
Throughout this paper, we have allowed the attacker to use memory as large as the dimension of the QIM lattice. As discussed below Proposition 8.2, the larger is, the more advantageous the outcome seems to be for the attacker, even when randomized lattice rotation is allowed. For instance, the error exponent was for the STDM example considered. Perhaps this result should not be surprising if we recall that the attacker operates under average-distortion constraints and we view the above result in light of the studies in [9] and [10] . There, if the attacker's memory is , he or she may use a devastating nonergodic strategy: "do nothing" with a fixed probability , and "kill the signal" with probability (incurring a large but finite distortion). The resulting probability of error is , independent of the value of . The AWGN Delta attack developed in Section VIII-B is somewhat analogous in that the attacker uses overwhelming power (vectors with total energy ) with low probability . Note that the probability of atypically large distortions (with respect to the expected value) increases dramatically with . Indeed, using large-deviations analysis, one can show that for any fixed . For large , one could argue that by introducing large distortion with excessive probability, the attacker exploits a loophole in the rules of the game. To close this loophole, for large , we may want to replace the average-distortion constraint used throughout this paper with a stronger maximum-distortion constraint on each vector . Mathematically, this equivalent to constraining the support of to a spherical ball with radius , which introduces a new linear equality constraint and, therefore, leads to the exact same kind of optimization algorithms.
Another observation is that our rules allow the attacker to create error patterns that occur in bursts (e.g., the AWGN Delta attack wipes out entire blocks). This strategy could be circumvented by using interleaving prior to block-QIM embedding; interleaving has the effect of making the attack channel essentially memoryless [32] . The results of Section V on worst memoryless attacks become even more relevant in this context.
APPENDIX A DECODING ERROR BOUNDS
This appendix presents a brief derivation of coding bounds and motivates the use of the Bhattacharyya parameter (4.16) as a performance metric. The first part of this material is detailed in Gallager's book [17] , and the second part extends it to the case of block codes with shared parameters at the encoder and decoder.
Consider a message set and a set of codewords associated with the messages in . Consider a binary hypothesis test between codewords and based on the received data . Denote by , , and , the joint composition of the codewords and (i.e., the number of positions where and ). The numbers sum to . The probability of error for this test is given by where we have used the inequality which holds for any non-negative numbers and . Using the union bound, we obtain (A.1) Consider codes such that : : (i.e., they have uniform distribution over the alphabet , normalized minimum distance , and codewords pairs have constant joint composition). Then, (A.1) simplifies into Assume now that a parameter is generated for each block by drawing independently from a distribution on . The parameters are shared with the decoder; denoted by the conditional probability distribution at the output of the channel. independent of all other random variables in the problem, and such that . Given any two attack channels and , suppose the attacker observes and selects if and otherwise. Equivalently, the attacker selects the noise vector according to the mixture pdf . If is unknown to the decoder, the probability of error is . However, if is known to the decoder, the probability of error is . Since the decoder has more information in the latter case, the probability of error cannot exceed that in the first case. This proves (B.1).
2) Since
, the functional is a negative -divergence. The claim is then a direct consequence of Lemma 4.1 in [28, p. 448]: given two pdfs and defined over a common domain, the negative -divergence is concave in the pair . In our problem, are subject to linear constraints, and the common domain is . 3) When , the Bhattacharyya distance is a convex decreasing function of the negative -divergence of Part ii). Since that negative -divergence is concave in , is convex [24] . When , is a sum of convex functions and is therefore convex. Denote by the minimum of (C.5). The minimum over all pdfs is equal to the infimum over all discrete distributions. Denoted by , the restriction of the support set of discrete to the open interval , we write
where the infima are subject to (C.9) (C.10)
The first infimum in (C.8) is over all discrete subsets of the open interval , and the sequence has components . The sequences and have components and , respectively. Observe now that the optimization problem is separable in the components of and invariant to permutations of the joint sequence . Therefore, owing to the convexity of the optimization problem, there is no loss in optimality in requiring that all , , and be independent of . Let , , and denote the corresponding values of , , and , respectively. We obtain (C.11) subject to (C.12) (C.13)
In other words, without loss of optimality, we may restrict our attention to index sets made of a single element. The resulting will be a distribution with support at four points and . Next, observe that the optimization over may be absorbed in the distortion constraint The system (C. 19 To explicitly indicate the dependency of the coarse lattice on , we use the notation . The normalized second moment of is defined as [6] and [20] There exists a sequence of lattices that are good for quantization in the sense that as [21] . 8 Given such a sequence of lattices, define We need to prove that (E.1) in which the asymptotically maxmin solution is and . Owing to our choice of , the claim (E.1) is equivalent to (E.2)
The average variance of the components of in (4.3) is given by where the latter upper bound is achieved by . Let be a Gaussian random vector with i.i.d. components and average variance . We have [31] (E.3)
The Gaussian upper bound (E.3) on is not achievable for any finite , because is uniformly distributed over and, therefore, cannot be Gaussian. However, Erez and Zamir [6] 
